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Abstract—In this paper, the 2-dimensional decentralized
parallel interference channel (IC) with 2 transmitter-receiver
pairs is modelled as a non-cooperative static game. Each
transmitter is assumed to be a fully rational entity with
complete information on the game, aiming to maximize its
own individual spectral efficiency by tuning its own power
allocation (PA) vector. Two scenarios are analysed. First, we
consider that transmitters can split their transmit power
between both dimensions (PA game). Second, we consider that
each transmitter is limited to use only one dimension (channel
selection CS game). In the first scenario, the game might have
either one or three NE in pure strategies (PS). However, two
or infinitely many NE in PS might also be observed with zero
probability. In the second scenario, there always exists either
one or two NE in PS. Using Monte-Carlo simulations, we show
that in both games there always exists a non-zero probability
of observing more than one NE. More interestingly, we show
that the highest and lowest network spectral efficiency at any of
the NE in the CS game are always higher than the ones in the PA.
Keywords: Interference Channel, Decentralized Network,
Nash Equilibrium, Braess Paradox, Spectrum Efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article addresses the interaction of 2 transmitters-
receiver links subject to mutual interference due to the use
of 2 common frequency bands. Here, each transmitter com-
municates only with its corresponding receiver aiming to
maximize its individual spectral efficiency (ISE) regardless
of the ISE achieved by the other link. We do not consider
neither transmitter nor receiver cooperation and any kind
of message exchanging between transmitters is completely
avoided. Thus, this interaction through mutual interference is
modelled by two different static strategic games. In the first
game, we consider that transmitters can simultaneously use
both channels (frequency bands). In the second game, we limit
each transmitter to use only one of the two available channels.
In the following, we refer to the former as the power allocation
(PA) game and the latter as channel selection (CS) game.
In both games, transmitters are assumed to be fully rational
entities with complete information. This assumption might
appear not practically appealing, however, our interest focuses
in identifying the set of Nash equilibria of each of the games in
order to compare the system spectral efficiency, i.e., the sum
of all the ISE, achieved in each game. Any mechanism or
algorithm for achieving NE under real-system implementation
constraints is considered out of the scope of this paper. The
interested reader is referred to [1], [2] and references therein.
Regarding the existence and uniqueness of the NE in the PA
game, many results are already known for more general cases
than the one described here. In the most general case, i.e.,
the K-transmitter MIMO decentralized interference channel,
the existence of the NE has been already proved in [2]. The
same holds for the interference relay channel described in
[3]. However, regarding the multiplicity of the NE in the PA
game, much less is known. For instance, in [2] sufficient but
not necessary conditions for the uniqueness are provided and,
aside from the result in [3], the exact number of NE in pure
strategies, even in the case with only two players, it is not
known.
Conversely to the PA game, no results are known with respect
to the existence or multiplicity of the NE. The relevance of
the CS game relies on the fact that under non-perfect channel
estimations, the water-filling PA [2] can not be implemented,
and thus, transmitters must either transmit over a single
channel e.g., Wi-Fi networks, or to use predefined power
allocation vectors. More importantly, it has been shown that
significant benefits from the global system point of view are
obtained by limiting the transmitters to use a reduced number
of channels, at least in the parallel multiple access channel [4],
[5]. This result implies the existence of a Braess type paradox
[6], since reducing the set of actions of each player leads to a
better global performance. The existence of this paradox has
been already reported for specific channel realizations in the
interference channel [7], [8].
The main contributions of this paper can be listed as follows.
(i) Contrary to previous beliefs [9], the number of NE in
the PA game is shown to be 1 or 3 depending on the exact
channel realizations. However, with zero-probability, it is also
possible to observe either 2 or infinitely many NE. This result
aligns with the number of NE in the interference relay channel
described in [3]. (ii) Depending on the channel realizations,
any feasible channel selection in the CS game might be an
NE. Here, we provide conditions over the channel realizations
for every case. Moreover for any channel realization it always
exist at least one NE in pure strategy. (iii) The number of NE
in the CS game is either one or two depending on the channel
realizations. (iv) The best and worst average system spectral
efficiency achieved in equilibrium in the CS game is better
than the best and worst average system spectral efficiency
achieved in equilibrium in the PA game.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we describe the
decentralized parallel interference channel addressed in this
paper. In Sec. III, we present the formal game formulation of
both the PA game and CS game. In Sec. IV and V, we provide
the main results regarding the existence and multiplicity of
the NE in the PA game and CS game, respectively. In VI,
we use Monte-Carlo methods to identify the probability of the
different number of NE in both the PA and CS games. We also
compare using Monte-Carlo simulations the system spectral
efficiency achieved by both games. This paper is concluded
by Sec. VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a set K 4= {1, 2} of transmitter-receiver pairs.
Each transmitter sends private information to its respective
receiver trough out a set S 4= {1, 2} of orthogonal channels.
Here, the channel orthogonality is assumed in the frequency
domain and transmissions take place simultaneously, thus
communications are subject to mutual interference. Denote by
yj =
(
y
(1)
j , y
(2)
j
)T
the 2-dimensional vector representing the
received signal at receiver j ∈ K. Hence, yj can be written
in the baseband at the symbol rate as follows,
yj =
2∑
k=1
Hj,kxk + zj . (1)
Here, ∀(j, k) ∈ K2, the matrix Hj,k is the channel transfer
matrix from transmitter k to the receiver j, and Hj,k =
diag
(
h
(1)
j,k, h
(2)
j,k
)
. Besides ∀(j, k, s) ∈ K2×S, h(s)j,k represents
the channel realization between transmitter k and receiver
j over channel s. In our analysis, flat fading channels are
assumed, i.e., each channel realization is time-invariant over
the whole channel use (e.g., frame length). The entries h(s)j,k are
time-invariant realizations of a complex circularly symmetric
Gaussian random variable, with zero mean and unit variance.
The vector xk =
(
x
(1)
k , x
(2)
k
)
is the vector of symbols
transmitted by transmitter k. For all s ∈ S, x(s)k represents
the symbol sent by transmitter k over channel s. Here, xk
is a 2-dimensional complex circularly symmetric Gaussian
random variable with zero mean and covariance matrix P k =
E (xkx
∗
k) = diag
(
p
(1)
k , p
(2)
k
)
. For all (k, s) ∈ K × S, p(s)k
represents the transmit power allocated by transmitter k over
channel s. Transmitters are power-limited, that is,
∀k ∈ K, p
(1)
k + p
(2)
k 6 pk,max, (2)
where pk,max is the maximum transmit power of transmitter
k. A power allocation (PA) vector for transmitter k ∈ K
is any vector pk =
(
p
(1)
k , p
(2)
k
)
with non-negative en-
tries satisfying (2). The noise vector zj , j ∈ K, is a 2-
dimensional zero mean Gaussian random variable with in-
dependent, equal variance real and imaginary parts. Here,
E
(
zjz
∗
j
)
= diag
(
(σ
(1)
j )
2, (σ
(2)
j )
2
)
, where, (σ(s)j )2 repre-
sents the noise power in the receiver j over channel s.
We denote the individual spectral efficiency (in [bps/Hz])
of each transmitter k as follows:
uk(pk,p−k) =
∑
s∈S
log2

1 + p
(s)
k
∣∣∣h(s)k,k∣∣∣2
(σ
(s)
k )
2 + p
(s)
−k
∣∣∣h(s)k,−k∣∣∣2

 .
(3)
In the following, we focus on the scenario where each trans-
mitter k ∈ K aims at maximizing its individual spectral
efficiency (3) by tuning its corresponding power policy. We
consider two problems:
(i) The Power Allocation (PA) Problem: where, each trans-
mitter k is allowed to tune its power allocation vector pk
splitting the maximum available power into both channels, i.e.,
p
(s)
k ∈ [0, pk,max];
(ii) The Channel Selection (CS) Problem: where, each
transmitter k is limited into using only one channel at a time
with full power, i.e., p(s)k ∈ {0, pk,max}.
III. NORMAL-FORM GAME FORMULATION
The PA and CS problems described in Sec. II can be
respectively modelled by the following two non-cooperative
static games in strategic form (with i ∈ {a, b}):
G(i) =
(
K,
(
P
(i)
k
)
k∈K
, (uk)k∈K
)
. (4)
In both games, the set of transmitters K is the set of players.
An action of a given transmitter k is a particular PA scheme,
i.e., a 2-dimensional PA vector pk =
(
p
(1)
k , p
(2)
k
)
∈ P
(i)
k ,
where P(i)k is the set of all possible PA vectors which
transmitter k can use either in the game G(a) (i = a) or in the
game G(b) (i = b). An action profile of the game i ∈ {a, b} is
a super vector
p = (p1,p2) ∈ P
(i),
where P(i) is a set obtained from the Cartesian product of the
action sets, i.e., P(i) = P(i)1 × P
(i)
2 .
The utility function for player k in the games G(i) is denoted
by uk : P(i) → R, with i ∈ {1, 2} and corresponds to the
individual spectral efficiency of transmitter k (3).
The solution concept used in this paper is that of Nash
equilibrium (NE) [10]. A NE is an action profile p ∈ P(i),
i ∈ {1, 2}, such that, no player would increase its individual
utility by unilateral deviation.
Definition 1 (Pure Nash Equilibrium): In the non-
cooperative games in strategic form G(i), with i ∈ {a, b}, an
action profile p ∈ P(i) is an NE if it satisfies, for all k ∈ K
and for all p′k ∈ P(i)k , that
uk(pk,p−k) > uk(p
′
k,p−k). (5)
Note that, from Def. 1, it becomes clear that, at the NE, each
player’s action is the best response to the actions taken by
all the other players. An alternative definition of the NE can
be stated using the concept of best response correspondence,
which we define as follows,
Definition 2 (Best-Response Correspondence): In the non-
cooperative games in strategic form G(i), with i ∈ {a, b}, the
relation BR(i)k : P
(i)
−k → P
(i)
k such that
BR
(i)
k
(
p−k
)
= arg max
q
k
∈P
(i)
k
uk
(
qk,p−k
)
, (6)
is defined as the best-response correspondence of player k ∈
K, given the actions p−k ∈ P
(i)
−k adopted by all the other
players.
Note that we denote by −k the user other than k. For all
i ∈ {a, b}, let the action profile p∗ ∈ P(i) be an NE and let the
correspondence BR : P(i) → P(i) be defined by BR (p) =
{q ∈ P(i) : q1 ∈ BR
(i)
1 (p2) and q2 ∈ BR
(i)
2 (p1)}. Hence,
∀k ∈ K, it holds that
p∗ ∈ BR (p∗) . (7)
Finally, in both games, the PA vector of player k, p′k =(
p
′(1)
k , p
′(2)
k
)
, such that p′(1)k + p
′(2)
k < pk,max is strictly
dominated by a vector pk =
(
p
′(1)
k + 1, p
′(2)
k + 2
)
satisfying
the power constraints (2) with i ∈ {a, b} and for all s ∈ S,
s > 0. Then, without any loss of generality, for all i ∈ {a, b}
and for all k ∈ K, we can write the sets P(i)k as follows,
P
(a)
k =
{(
p
(1)
k , p
(2)
k
)
∈ R2 : p
(1)
k = αkpk,max and (8)
p
(2)
k = pk,max(1− αk), with αk ∈ [0, 1]
}
,
P
(b)
k =
{(
p
(1)
k , p
(2)
k
)
∈ R2 : p
(1)
k = αkpk,max and (9)
p
(2)
k = pk,max(1− αk), with αk ∈ {0, 1}
}
.
In the following section, both Def. 1 and Def. 2 are used
to study the set of NE of both games G(i), with i ∈ {a, b}.
IV. THE POWER ALLOCATION GAME
In this section, we analyse the existence and the uniqueness
of the NE in the PA game G(a).
A. Existence of the NE
The main result regarding the existence of the NE is stated
in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Existence of NE in the PA Game): The game
G(a) has always at least one NE in pure strategies.
The proof of Theorem 3 follows immediately from Theorem
1 in [11]. Note that, for all k ∈ K, the utility function (3)
of player k is continuous and concave over the set of actions
P
(b)
k and the set P(b) is compact and convex. An alternative
proof can be obtained from Theorem 3.2 in [3] or Theorem 1
in [12].
B. Multiplicity of the NE
In this subsection, we determine the number of possible NE
which the game G(a) can possess. In particular, it is found that,
with probability one, it is possible to observe only one or three
NE. Finally, some sufficient conditions for observing a unique
NE are stated.
Theorem 4 (Multiplicity of NE): The game G(a) might
have either one, two, three or infinitely many NE in pure
strategies.
The proof of Theorem 4 follows the same line of the proof
of Theorem 3.3 in [3] and it is divided in two steps. First, we
obtain an explicit expression for the BR correspondence (Def.
2) for both players; second, the set of solutions of the fixed
point equation in (7) is determined. That is, for all k ∈ K,
let the action profile pk =
(
p
(1)
k , p
(2)
k
)
be written as follows
pk = pk,max (αk, 1− αk), with 0 6 αk 6 1, representing the
fraction of power that transmitter k uses over channel one.
Then, with a slight abuse of notation, (3) can be written as
follows,
uk(αk, α−k) = log
(
1 +
αkg
(1)
k,k
1 + α−kg
(1)
k,−k
)
+
log
(
1 +
(1 − αk)g
(2)
k,k
1 + (1− α−k)g
(2)
k,−k
)
, (10)
where,
g
(s)
j,k = pk,max
|hj,k|
2
(σ
(s)
j )
2
. (11)
Hence, the best response of player k to the action p−k ∈ P
(a)
−k ,
denoted by pk,max (α∗k, (1− α∗k)), with 0 6 α∗k 6 1, can be
written in terms of α−k. For instance,
BR
(a)
k (p−k) = BR
(a)
k (p−k,max (α−k, 1− α−k)) ,
= pk,max (α
∗
k, (1− α
∗
k)) , (12)
where α∗k is the optimal fraction of transmit power transmitter
k must use over channel 1. Following Def. 2, we obtain
α∗k =


ckα−k + dk if ckα−k + dk ∈ [0, 1]
0 if ckα−k + dk < 0
1 if ckα−k + dk > 1
, (13)
where,
ck = −
1
2
(
g
(1)
k,−k
g
(1)
k,k
+
g
(2)
k,−k
g
(2)
k,k
)
(14)
dk =
g
(1)
k,k(1 + g
(2)
k,−k) + g
(2)
k,k(g
(1)
k,k − 1)
2g
(1)
k,kg
(2)
k,k
. (15)
Once an explicit expression has been obtained for the BR
correspondence of each player, the set of NE corresponds to
the set of solutions to the fixed point inclusion (7). In Fig. 1,
we plot the mappings α∗k : [0, 1]→ [0, 1], as defined by (13).
Therein, any crossing point of both graphs is a solution of (7).
Note that from Fig. 1, it becomes evident that the number of
intersection points can be either 1, 2, 3 or infinitely many.
For a further analysis, we denote by α† = (α†1,α
†
2) the
intersection point of the two lines,
γk : α1 = mkα2 + qk; (16)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e)
α1α1
α1
α1α1
α2 α2
α2 α2
11
1
11
11
1
11
Fig. 1. The mappings α∗
k
: [0, 1] → [0, 1], with k = 1 and k = 2 are
represented by the red straight line and the dashed green line, respectively.
The black dashed and dotted lines represent the lines in (16), with k = 1 and
k = 2, respectively. Fig. (a) and (b) represents the case of unique NE, Fig.
(c) and (d) represent the case of 2 and 3 NE, respectively. Fig. (e) represents
the case of infinitely many NE.
with k ∈ {1, 2}, where m1 = c1, q1 = d1, m2 = 1c2 and
q2 = −
d2
c2
. Hence, it follows that,
α
†
2 =
q2−q1
m1−m2
= d1c2+d21−c1c2 ,
α
†
1 = m1α
†
2 + q1 =
d2c1+d1
1−c1c2
.
(17)
A geometrical analysis of Fig. 1 leads to the following
conclusions:
(i) if α† 6∈ [0, 1]2 then there is only one NE, where one player
uses only one channel, while the other uses a water-filling PA
vector [13]. See Fig. 1 (a).
(ii) if the following two conditions are met:
• ∃k ∈ K, such that α†k ∈ {0, 1} and α
†
−k ∈ [0, 1]
• |m1| > |m2|
then the game has two NE. See Fig. 1 (c).
(iii) if the two lines, γ1 and γ2, overlap, then the system has
infinitely many NE. See Fig. 1 (e).
(iv) if α† ∈ [0, 1]2 and m1
m2
> 1 then there are three NE. See
Fig. 1 (d)
(v) if α† ∈ [0, 1]2 and m1
m2
< 1 then there is only one NE.
See Fig. 1 (b).
Note that the next corollary follows immediately from conclu-
sions (ii) and (iii), since the channels are random variables
drawn from continuous distributions, and thus, the correspond-
ing conditions are zero probability events.
Corollary 5: The game G(a) has, with probability one,
either one or three NE in pure strategies.
In the following, we provide sufficient conditions to observe
a unique NE.
Theorem 6 (Uniqueness of NE in the PA Game): The
game G(a) has one NE if and only if at least one of the
following conditions is satisfied.
(a) (ρ
(1)
1 + ρ
(2)
1 )(ρ
(1)
2 + ρ
(2)
2 ) < 4 (18)
(b) ∃k ∈ K : α†k < 0 or α
†
k > 1 (19)
where
∀(k, s) ∈ K × S, ρ
(s)
k =
|h
(s)
k,−k|
2
|h
(s)
k,k|
2
. (20)
The proof of Theorem 6 is as follows. From conditions (i)
- (iv), a sufficient condition to observe a unique NE can be
implied:
|m2| > |m1|. (21)
Then, following equation (20), it is possible to write
m1 = −
p2,max
2p1,max
(ρ
(2)
1 + ρ
(1)
1 ), (22)
and
m2 =
−2p2,max
p1,max(ρ
(2)
2 + ρ
(1)
2 )
, (23)
and thus, replacing (22) and (23) in (21) yields equation (18).
Condition (b) is inferred by graphical arguments. The direct
implication comes from (a) in Fig. 1, for the reverse one we
have to notice that, with probability one, we can observe either
one NE ((a) and (b) in Fig. 1) or three ((d) in Fig. 1). As a
consequence, the uniqueness of the NE implies (18) or (19).
Note that, (18) represents the geometric average of the al-
gebraic average of the ratios between the interfering and
direct channels. Interestingly, it shows also that, if the direct
channels are always stronger than the interfering ones, or if
one transmitter-receiver couple is isolated from the other (i.e.
∃(k, s) ∈ K × S : g
(s)
k,−k = 0), then the NE is unique. Finally,
we would like to point out the fact that condition (18) is in
accordance both with the one in [12] and in [14] for obseving a
unique NE. However, the condition in [12] appears to be more
restrictive, while the condition in [14] can be easily deducted
from (18), by setting ρ(1)1 = 0 and ρ(1)2 = 0.
V. CHANNEL SELECTION GAME
In this section, we study the channel selection game G(b).
In this case, contrary to the PA the action space is a discrete
set, thus the existence of a pure NE is not deducible from the
application of Theorem 1 in [11]. Let the channel selection
vector of player k, be denoted by pk = pk,max (αk, 1− αk),
with αk ∈ {0, 1}. In the following we will indifferently refer
to the Channel Selection NE p∗ = (p∗1, p∗2) as α∗ = (α∗1, α∗2)
with α∗k ∈ {0, 1}.
Hence, all the outcomes of the game can be described by
the table hereunder:
Tx1\Tx2 α2 = 1 α2 = 0
α1 = 1 (u1(1, 1), u2(1, 1)) (u1(1, 0), u2(0, 1))
α1 = 0 (u1(0, 1), u2(1, 0)) (u1(0, 0), u2(0, 0))
Fig. 2. Utility obtained by player 1 and 2, where uk is defined by (10).
Player 1 chooses rows and player 2 chooses columns.
In the following, we study the existence and the multiplicity
of the NE of the game G(b).
A. Existence of the NE
The main result regarding the existence of the game G(b) is
the following.
Theorem 7 (Existence of NE in the CS Game): The game
G(b) has always at least one NE in pure strategies.
The proof of Theorem 7 follows from showing that for any
vector g =
(
g
(s)
j,k
)
(j,k,s)∈K2×S2
∈ R8, there always exists an
outcome α∗ = (α∗1, α
∗
2), which is a NE. To prove it we will
perform an exhaustive search. Without any loss of generality,
let us assume g(1)1,1 > g
(2)
1,1 then,
• if g(2)2,2 > g
(1)
2,2, then α∗ = (1, 0) is a NE;
• if g(2)2,2 < g
(1)
2,2, then
– if g(1)2,2 < g
(2)
2,2(1 + g
(1)
2,1), then α∗ = (1, 0) is a NE;
– if g(1)2,2 > g
(2)
2,2(1 + g
(1)
2,1), then
∗ g
(1)
1,1 > g
(2)
1,1(1 + g
(1)
1,2), then α∗ = (1, 1) is a NE;
∗ g
(1)
1,1 < g
(2)
1,1(1 + g
(1)
1,2), then α∗ = (1, 0) is a NE;
We analyse all the possible NE in the following subsection.
B. Multiplicity of the NE
In the game G(b), depending on the channel realizations,
any of the four outcomes of the game can be a NE as shown
in Theorem 8. However, as we shall see, the game may have
either one or two NE.
Theorem 8 (NE in G(b)): Consider the game G(b) and let
α∗ = (α∗1, α
∗
2) identify the channel selection p∗k =
pk,max(α
∗
k, 1− α
∗
k)∀k ∈ K.Then
1) α∗ = (1, 1) is a NE if and only if{
g
(1)
1,1 > g
(2)
1,1(1 + g
(1)
1,2)
g
(1)
2,2 > g
(2)
2,2(1 + g
(1)
2,1)
(24)
2) α∗ = (0, 0) is a NE if and only if{
g
(2)
1,1 > g
(1)
1,1(1 + g
(2)
1,2)
g
(2)
2,2 > g
(1)
2,2(1 + g
(2)
2,1)
(25)
3) α∗ = (0, 1) is a NE if and only if{
g
(2)
1,1(1 + g
(1)
1,2) > g
(1)
1,1
g
(1)
2,2(1 + g
(2)
2,1) > g
(2)
2,2
(26)
4) α∗ = (1, 0) is a NE if and only if{
g
(1)
1,1(1 + g
(2)
1,2) > g
(2)
1,1
g
(2)
2,2(1 + g
(1)
2,1) > g
(1)
2,2
(27)
The proof of Theorem 8 is an immediate result from Fig. 2 and
Def. 1. An important conclusion which follows immediately
from Theorem 8 is the following.
Corollary 9 (Multiplicity of the NE in the CS game): The
game G(b) has always either one or two NE in pure strategies.
This result follows from the fact that if there exists a player
with a dominant strategy, the game G(b) has a unique NE. If
none of the players possesses a dominant strategy, the game
G(b) is an anti-coordination game with two NE α∗ = (1, 0)
and α∗ = (0, 1).
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Fig. 3. Probability of observing either one or three NE in the game G(a).
We refer to type (a), the case where there exists a unique NE such that
∃k ∈ K : α∗
k
∈ {0, 1} (see Fig 1 (a)). Type (b) refers to the case where
there exists a unique NE and ∀k ∈ K, α∗ ∈ [0, 1]2 (See Fig 1 (b)). Type
(d) refers to the case where there exists three NE.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, we provide
numerical approximations of the probability of observing
either one or three NE in the game G(a), and the probability
of observing one or two NE in G(b). Second, we provide
numerical calculations of the utilities achieved in the games
G(a) and G(b), in order to evaluate which game brings the
highest system spectral efficiency at the equilibrium, i.e., the
sum of all individual spectral efficiencies (3).
In the first experiment, we generate 106 vectors of channel
realizations g =
(
g
(s)
j,k
)
(j,k,s)∈K2×S
∈ R8 and, for each
realization, the number of NE of the corresponding game
is calculated. In G(a), when only one NE is observed, we
distinguish between the case where ∃k ∈ K : α∗k ∈ {0, 1} (see
Fig. 1 (a)) and the case where α∗ ∈ [0, 1]2 (See Fig. 1 (b)).
The results of this Monte Carlo simulation are reported in Fig.
4. About G(b), the results are reported in Fig. 5. As for G(a),
the probability of observing a multiple NE increases with the
SNR. This is easily explicable by noting that low SNR also
means that the interference is negligible when compared to the
the noise and vice-versa. As a consequence, when the noise is
the major concern (low SNR regime) the transmitter will try
to optimize its spectral efficiency by selecting the least noisy
channel regardless of the interference. When, on the contrary,
the major concern is the interference (high SNR regime) then
avoiding the channel used by the other transmitter becomes the
priority. Note that the game G(a) has only one NE with a high
probability, however, three NE can be observed with a non-
negligible one. This result implies that designing algorithms
for achieving NE (see [1]) in decentralized networks requires
to tackle the problem of equilibrium selection, which is a
problem that has been neglected in most recent literature [1],
[2].
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In the second experiment, we generate 106 vectors of
channel realizations g =
(
g
(s)
j,k
)
(j,k,s)∈K2×S
∈ R8 and for
each realization, the utility achieved in each of the NE of
the games G(a) and G(b) is calculated. In Fig. 4, we report
the average sum-utility achieved in any of the NE of the
games G(a) and G(b). Note that a higher spectral efficiency
is observed when transmitters are limited to use only one
channel. This result can be interpreted as a Braess paradox [6]
and generalizes the founds in [5], [7] and [8]. Here, reducing
the set of actions of each player leads to a higher sum-utility,
i.e., a higher system spectral efficiency.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a game theoretical analysis
of the 2-dimensional parallel interference channel with two
transmitter-receiver pairs. Two games were analysed. First, the
power allocation game where transmitters can simultaneously
use both channels. Second, the channel selection game, where
transmitters use only one of the available channels at a time.
Here, the number of NE in the PA game has been proved to
be either 1 or 3 depending on the exact channel realizations.
However, it has been also shown that with zero-probability, it
is possible to observe either 2 or infinitely many NE. Regard-
ing the CS game, depending on the channel realizations, any
feasible channel selection might be a NE. Here, we provide
conditions over the channel realizations for every case. In
particular, the number of NE in pure strategies in the CS game
is either one or two depending on the channel realizations.
Finally, we showed, by using Monte-Carlo simulations, that
the best and worst average system spectral efficiency achieved
in equilibrium in the CS game is better than the best and worst
average system spectral efficiency achieved in equilibrium in
the PA game.
REFERENCES
[1] G. Scutari, D. Palomar, and S. Barbarossa, “Optimal linear precoding
strategies for wideband non-cooperative systems based on game theory
– part II: Algorithms,” IEEE Trans. on Signal Processing, vol. 56, no. 3,
pp. 1250–1267, mar. 2008.
[2] ——, “The MIMO iterative waterfilling algorithm,” IEEE Transactions
on Signal Processing, vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 1917–1935, May 2009.
[3] E. V. Belmega, B. Djeumou, and S. Lasaulce, “Resource allocation
games in interference relay channels,” in IEEE International Conference
on Game Theory for Networks (GAMENETS), Istanbul, Turkey, May
2009, pp. 575–584.
[4] S. M. Perlaza, M. Debbah, S. Lasaulce, and H. Bogucka, “On the
benefits of bandwidth limiting in decentralized vector multiple access
channels,” in Proc. 4th Intl. Conf. on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless
Networks and Comm. (CROWNCOM), May 2009.
[5] S. M. Perlaza, E. V. Belmega, S. Lasaulce, and M. Debbah, “On
the base station selection and base station sharing in self-configuring
networks,” 3rd ICST/ACM International Workshop on Game Theory in
Communication Networks, Oct. 2009.
[6] D. Braess, “ber ein paradoxon aus der verkehrsplanung,” Un-
ternehmensforschung, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 258 – 268, May 1969.
[7] E. Altman, V. Kumar, and H. Kameda, “A Braess type paradox in
power control over interference channels,” Symposium on Modeling and
Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks - WiOPT, Apr.
2008.
[8] E. Altman, T. Jimenez, N. Vicuna, and R. Marquez, “Coordination
games over collision channels,” 6th Intl Symp. on Modeling and Op-
timization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks - WiOPT, April
2008.
[9] M. Bennis, M. Le Treust, S. Lasaulce, M. Debbah, and J. Lilleberg,
“Spectrum sharing games on the interference channel,” in GameNets’09:
Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory
for Networks. Piscataway, NJ, USA: IEEE Press, 2009, pp. 515–522.
[10] J. F. Nash, “Equilibrium points in n-person games,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 36,
no. 1, pp. 48–49, 1950.
[11] J. B. Rosen, “Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points for concave
n-person games,” Econometrica, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 520–534, 1965.
[12] G. Scutari, D. P. Palomar, and S. Barbarossa, “Competitive design of
multiuser mimo systems based on game theory: A unified view,” IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 26, no. 7, pp. 1089–
1103, 2008.
[13] D. Tse and P. Viswanath, “Fundamentals of wireless communication,”
June 2005.
[14] E. Jorswieck and R. Mochaourab, “Power control game in protected
and shared bands: manipulability of nash equilibrium,” in GameNets’09:
Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory
for Networks. Piscataway, NJ, USA: IEEE Press, 2009, pp. 428–437.
